+@node Reliability and security
+@chapter Reliability and Security
+
+The @command{tar} command reads and writes files as any other
+application does, and is subject to the usual caveats about
+reliability and security. This section contains some commonsense
+advice on the topic.
+
+@menu
+* Reliability::
+* Security::
+@end menu
+
+@node Reliability
+@section Reliability
+
+Ideally, when @command{tar} is creating an archive, it reads from a
+file system that is not being modified, and encounters no errors or
+inconsistencies while reading and writing. If this is the case, the
+archive should faithfully reflect what was read. Similarly, when
+extracting from an archive, ideally @command{tar} ideally encounters
+no errors and the extracted files faithfully reflect what was in the
+archive.
+
+However, when reading or writing real-world file systems, several
+things can go wrong; these include permissions problems, corruption of
+data, and race conditions.
+
+@menu
+* Permissions problems::
+* Data corruption and repair::
+* Race conditions::
+@end menu
+
+@node Permissions problems
+@subsection Permissions Problems
+
+If @command{tar} encounters errors while reading or writing files, it
+normally reports an error and exits with nonzero status. The work it
+does may therefore be incomplete. For example, when creating an
+archive, if @command{tar} cannot read a file then it cannot copy the
+file into the archive.
+
+@node Data corruption and repair
+@subsection Data Corruption and Repair
+
+If an archive becomes corrupted by an I/O error, this may corrupt the
+data in an extracted file. Worse, it may corrupt the file's metadata,
+which may cause later parts of the archive to become misinterpreted.
+An tar-format archive contains a checksum that most likely will detect
+errors in the metadata, but it will not detect errors in the data.
+
+If data corruption is a concern, you can compute and check your own
+checksums of an archive by using other programs, such as
+@command{cksum}.
+
+When attempting to recover from a read error or data corruption in an
+archive, you may need to skip past the questionable data and read the
+rest of the archive. This requires some expertise in the archive
+format and in other software tools.
+
+@node Race conditions
+@subsection Race conditions
+
+If some other process is modifying the file system while @command{tar}
+is reading or writing files, the result may well be inconsistent due
+to race conditions. For example, if another process creates some
+files in a directory while @command{tar} is creating an archive
+containing the directory's files, @command{tar} may see some of the
+files but not others, or it may see a file that is in the process of
+being created. The resulting archive may not be a snapshot of the
+file system at any point in time. If an application such as a
+database system depends on an accurate snapshot, restoring from the
+@command{tar} archive of a live file system may therefore break that
+consistency and may break the application. The simplest way to avoid
+the consistency issues is to avoid making other changes to the file
+system while tar is reading it or writing it.
+
+When creating an archive, several options are available to avoid race
+conditions. Some hosts have a way of snapshotting a file system, or
+of temporarily suspending all changes to a file system, by (say)
+suspending the only virtual machine that can modify a file system; if
+you use these facilities and have @command{tar -c} read from a
+snapshot when creating an archive, you can avoid inconsistency
+problems. More drastically, before starting @command{tar} you could
+suspend or shut down all processes other than @command{tar} that have
+access to the file system, or you could unmount the file system and
+then mount it read-only.
+
+When extracting from an archive, one approach to avoid race conditions
+is to create a directory that no other process can write to, and
+extract into that.
+
+@node Security
+@section Security
+
+In some cases @command{tar} may be used in an adversarial situation,
+where an untrusted user is attempting to gain information about or
+modify otherwise-inaccessible files. Dealing with untrusted data
+(that is, data generated by an untrusted user) typically requires
+extra care, because even the smallest mistake in the use of
+@command{tar} is more likely to be exploited by an adversary than by a
+race condition.
+
+@menu
+* Privacy::
+* Integrity::
+* Live untrusted data::
+* Security rules of thumb::
+@end menu
+
+@node Privacy
+@subsection Privacy
+
+Standard privacy concerns apply when using @command{tar}. For
+example, suppose you are archiving your home directory into a file
+@file{/archive/myhome.tar}. Any secret information in your home
+directory, such as your SSH secret keys, are copied faithfully into
+the archive. Therefore, if your home directory contains any file that
+should not be read by some other user, the archive itself should be
+not be readable by that user. And even if the archive's data are
+inaccessible to untrusted users, its metadata (such as size or
+last-modified date) may reveal some information about your home
+directory; if the metadata are intended to be private, the archive's
+parent directory should also be inaccessible to untrusted users.
+
+One precaution is to create @file{/archive} so that it is not
+accessible to any user, unless that user also has permission to access
+all the files in your home directory.
+
+Similarly, when extracting from an archive, take care that the
+permissions of the extracted files are not more generous than what you
+want. Even if the archive itself is readable only to you, files
+extracted from it have their own permissions that may differ.
+
+@node Integrity
+@subsection Integrity
+
+When creating archives, take care that they are not writable by a
+untrusted user; otherwise, that user could modify the archive, and
+when you later extract from the archive you will get incorrect data.
+
+When @command{tar} extracts from an archive, by default it writes into
+files relative to the working directory. If the archive was generated
+by an untrusted user, that user therefore can write into any file
+under the working directory. If the working directory contains a
+symbolic link to another directory, the untrusted user can also write
+into any file under the referenced directory. When extracting from an
+untrusted archive, it is therefore good practice to create an empty
+directory and run @command{tar} in that directory.
+
+When extracting from two or more untrusted archives, each one should
+be extracted independently, into different empty directories.
+Otherwise, the first archive could create a symbolic link into an area
+outside the working directory, and the second one could follow the
+link and overwrite data that is not under the working directory. For
+example, when restoring from a series of incremental dumps, the
+archives should have been created by a trusted process, as otherwise
+the incremental restores might alter data outside the working
+directory.
+
+If you use the @option{--absolute-names} (@option{-P}) option when
+extracting, @command{tar} respects any file names in the archive, even
+file names that begin with @file{/} or contain @file{..}. As this
+lets the archive overwrite any file in your system that you can write,
+the @option{--absolute-names} (@option{-P}) option should be used only
+for trusted archives.
+
+Conversely, with the @option{--keep-old-files} (@option{-k}) option,
+@command{tar} refuses to replace existing files when extracting; and
+with the @option{--no-overwrite-dir} option, @command{tar} refuses to
+replace the permissions or ownership of already-existing directories.
+These options may help when extracting from untrusted archives.
+
+@node Live untrusted data
+@subsection Dealing with Live Untrusted Data
+
+Extra care is required when creating from or extracting into a file
+system that is accessible to untrusted users. For example, superusers
+who invoke @command{tar} must be wary about its actions being hijacked
+by an adversary who is reading or writing the file system at the same
+time that @command{tar} is operating.
+
+When creating an archive from a live file system, @command{tar} is
+vulnerable to denial-of-service attacks. For example, an adversarial
+user could create the illusion of an indefinitely-deep directory
+hierarchy @file{d/e/f/g/...} by creating directories one step ahead of
+@command{tar}, or the illusion of an indefinitely-long file by
+creating a sparse file but arranging for blocks to be allocated just
+before @command{tar} reads them. There is no easy way for
+@command{tar} to distinguish these scenarios from legitimate uses, so
+you may need to monitor @command{tar}, just as you'd need to monitor
+any other system service, to detect such attacks.
+
+While a superuser is extracting from an archive into a live file
+system, an untrusted user might replace a directory with a symbolic
+link, in hopes that @command{tar} will follow the symbolic link and
+extract data into files that the untrusted user does not have access
+to. Even if the archive was generated by the superuser, it may
+contain a file such as @file{d/etc/passwd} that the untrusted user
+earlier created in order to break in; if the untrusted user replaces
+the directory @file{d/etc} with a symbolic link to @file{/etc} while
+@command{tar} is running, @command{tar} will overwrite
+@file{/etc/passwd}. This attack can be prevented by extracting into a
+directory that is inaccessible to untrusted users.
+
+Similar attacks via symbolic links are also possible when creating an
+archive, if the untrusted user can modify an ancestor of a top-level
+argument of @command{tar}. For example, an untrusted user that can
+modify @file{/home/eve} can hijack a running instance of @samp{tar -cf
+- /home/eve/Documents/yesterday} by replacing
+@file{/home/eve/Documents} with a symbolic link to some other
+location. Attacks like these can be prevented by making sure that
+untrusted users cannot modify any files that are top-level arguments
+to @command{tar}, or any ancestor directories of these files.
+
+@node Security rules of thumb
+@subsection Security Rules of Thumb
+
+This section briefly summarizes rules of thumb for avoiding security
+pitfalls.
+
+@itemize @bullet
+
+@item
+Protect archives at least as much as you protect any of the files
+being archived.
+
+@item
+Extract from an untrusted archive only into an otherwise-empty
+directory. This directory and its parent should be accessible only to
+trusted users. For example:
+
+@example
+@group
+$ @kbd{chmod go-rwx .}
+$ @kbd{mkdir -m go-rwx dir}
+$ @kbd{cd dir}
+$ @kbd{tar -xvf /archives/got-it-off-the-net.tar.gz}
+@end group
+@end example
+
+As a corollary, do not do an incremental restore from an untrusted archive.
+
+@item
+Do not let untrusted users access files extracted from untrusted
+archives without checking first for problems such as setuid programs.
+
+@item
+Do not let untrusted users modify directories that are ancestors of
+top-level arguments of @command{tar}. For example, while you are
+executing @samp{tar -cf /archive/u-home.tar /u/home}, do not let an
+untrusted user modify @file{/}, @file{/archive}, or @file{/u}.
+
+@item
+Pay attention to the diagnostics and exit status of @command{tar}.
+
+@item
+When archiving live file systems, monitor running instances of
+@command{tar} to detect denial-of-service attacks.
+
+@item
+Avoid unusual options such as @option{--absolute-names} (@option{-P}),
+@option{--dereference} (@option{-h}), @option{--overwrite},
+@option{--recursive-unlink}, and @option{--remove-files} unless you
+understand their security implications.
+
+@end itemize
+
projects / chaz / tar / commitdiff
